Tommy N. Turner

Independent researcher and writer. Institutional governance, public policy.

Portrait of Tommy N. Turner

All works · Virginia data center series — county case studies

Case Study: Chesterfield County — The $0.24 Rate, the Thirty-Year Lock, and the Two-Corridor County

Chesterfield built its data-center strategy on a single number: the equipment tax rate set at $0.24/$100 in April 2019 — a deliberate undercut of Henrico's $0.40 and the lowest in Virginia. Google assembled roughly 1,640 acres, Chirisa committed $2 billion, and Commonwealth Fusion Systems selected Battery Brooke for the world's first grid-scale commercial fusion plant. The rate is locked for thirty years.

Correction notice, 24 August 2026. Version 3.1 corrects the Rider CERC residential bill impact (previously ~$4.88/month attributed to “SCC analysis”; the Commission’s Final Order in Case No. PUR-2025-00037 states $0.60/month at 1,000 kWh, rising to $1.14/month in the 2027 rate year), the derived combined monthly rate impact, and two incorrect docket numbers (PUR-2023-00139 and PUR-2023-00066, correctly PUR-2025-00037 and PUR-2025-00058), and the PJM capacity-price increase attributed to the Dominion zone. The 833 percent figure is the Rest-of-RTO increase ($28.92 to $269.92/MW-day). The Dominion zone rose from $28.92 to $444.26/MW-day, an increase of 1,436 percent. The prior-year figure of ~$47.60/MW-day does not appear in PJM’s auction report. It supersedes DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20672437, which remains available and citable.

Chesterfield County built its data center strategy on a single number. In April 2019 the Board of Supervisors set the equipment tax rate at $0.24 per $100 of assessed value, a deliberate undercut of Henrico County's then-disruptive $0.40, and the lowest data center rate in Virginia. The strategy worked. Google assembled three sites totaling nearly 1,640 acres through shell entities, Chirisa committed $2 billion to Meadowville, and Commonwealth Fusion Systems selected Battery Brooke Parkway for the world's first grid-scale commercial fusion plant. This case study documents what the strategy cost: a 30-year contractual rate lock, structured as an EDA grant-back that survives any future board's repricing decision; a revenue gap of $91 million to $164 million a year against peer jurisdictions at full buildout; and a two-corridor regulatory record in which the county's most diverse, lowest-income corridor received its largest campus by-right, with no public hearing and no disclosure of water demand, while its most affluent corridor negotiated 750-foot buffers, closed-loop cooling, and 350 acres of permanent conservation.

The 2026 record extended every thread. The county defended its new conditional use framework at the Board of Zoning Appeals, which on June 3, 2026 unanimously rejected a developer's vested-rights challenge to the post-January 1 permit requirement, with a second appeal still pending. The State Corporation Commission's approval of Dominion's 944 MW Chesterfield Energy Reliability Center survived reconsideration and moved to the Supreme Court of Virginia, while the plant's air permit faces a separate challenge in Richmond Circuit Court, both cases brought on behalf of the fenceline communities that absorbed the coal station the gas plant replaces. Google pulled $215 million in building permits for its first Bermuda Hundred hall. The regional rate environment moved against the lock from every direction: Henrico collects $2.60, Prince William raised its rate to $4.50, and Hanover votes June 24 on a rate of up to $3.00. The state budget remained unresolved twelve days into June, with the data center sales tax exemption the central dispute and a July 1 shutdown threshold approaching.

The evidence is organized for an interdisciplinary research audience, with findings mapped throughout to five frameworks: distributional justice, institutional behavior, utility finance, energy and labor infrastructure, and energy geography. The central finding is structural. Henrico reformed after entitling and is living with what it grandfathered. Hanover refused before entitling and kept its leverage. Chesterfield contracted its leverage away: the county can tighten its zoning, and did, but the 30-year grant-back places the installed base beyond the reach of any repricing a future board might attempt. The reform's edge is real, and the BZA defended it. The edge stops where the contract begins.

Cite this work

BibTeX
@misc{turner2026casestudychesterfieldcou,
  author = {Turner, Tommy N.},
  title = {Case Study: Chesterfield County — The $0.24 Rate, the Thirty-Year Lock, and the Two-Corridor County},
  year = {2026},
  publisher = {Zenodo},
  version = {3.1},
  doi = {10.5281/zenodo.20672436},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20672436}
}
APA
Turner, T. N. (2026). Case Study: Chesterfield County — The $0.24 Rate, the Thirty-Year Lock, and the Two-Corridor County (Version 3.1). Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20672436
Chicago
Turner, Tommy N. 2026. “Case Study: Chesterfield County — The $0.24 Rate, the Thirty-Year Lock, and the Two-Corridor County.” Version 3.1. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20672436.